Witkoff's latest 'zero enrichment' red line has zero chance of working

Steve Witkow, who is acting as Donald Trump’s aggressive representative, is insisting on "no uranium enrichment" as the key condition in the negotiations with Iran—this inflexible position could potentially ruin diplomatic efforts completely.

"We have one crystal-clear boundary, and that is enrichment. Even 1% enrichment capacity is unacceptable," Witkoff says to ABC’s “This Week.”

"Everything starts... with an agreement that doesn’t involve enrichment... since enrichment can lead to weapons development, and we won't let a bomb reach this place," he explains.

As I recently argued in The American Conservative, this demand has, for 25 years, proven both futile and counterproductive. It gives Iran more time to advance its nuclear program while stalling the realistic, verification-based deals that could actually constrain it. Unless Trump reverts to his original red line — weaponization — this rare chance to stop both an Iranian bomb and a war could slip away.

Witkoff’s all-in approach might serve as a negotiating strategy; however, making it public can sour the mood. Once Iran begins responding positively, initial hope could swiftly turn into tension, potentially closing off Trump’s limited opportunity for diplomatic engagement.

Despite immediate tension not flaring up right away, this approach wastes precious time nonetheless. As the UN snapback deadline approaches, postponements can be perilous. Even though Secretary Marco Rubio might think initiating snapback increases pressure, it actually has the potential to create an unstable and unpredictable scenario.

China and Russia are expected to contest the legality of thesnapback, significantly diminishingits effectiveness. Attempting to persuade countries from theGlobal Southto enforce individual sanctions—which would be considerably more stringent than those imposed in 2011—will probably prove unsuccessful. AlthoughWestern diplomatsoften acknowledge this reality behind closed doors, they continue to assertthat proceeding with the snapbackis necessaryfor show rather than substance.

Trump will soon realize the limits of this approach and likely pivot — belatedly — toward negotiating an extension of the deadline. But that shift will drag the U.S. into a far messier arena: no longer a comparatively simple U.S.-Iran exchange, but a complex, time-consuming negotiation involving Russia, China, Germany, France, and the UK.

Witkoff might be hoping that his tough position will push Tehran to yield on an additional request: halting all forms of uranium enrichment for the remainder of Trump’s term as a provisional measure to build confidence.

But this is a shaky gamble for two key reasons: Iran is highly unlikely to agree, and even if it does, the payoff is questionable.

Tehran has consistently refused to completely stop enriching uranium—even on a temporary basis. They understand that resuming this activity would entail significant political repercussions, despite having fulfilled all their commitments under previous agreements. For them, ceasing their primary bargaining chip wouldn’t be worthwhile unless it’s guaranteed as part of future benefits. Moreover, they approach these negotiations lacking faith in the U.S., compounded by observing how Hamas was treated recently.

Hamas agreed to a three-stage agreement concerning Gaza, giving up much of their negotiating power during Phase I, even though they were aware that Israel's significant compromise would only occur in Phase III. As expected, Netanyahu ended the agreement following Phase I, restarted the conflict, and faced no consequences from the U.S. Iran observed this sequence of events—and learned from them.

Moreover, based on Drop Site News Last week's release of the American hostage Edan Alexander allegedly occurred in exchange for a U.S. commitment to urge Netanyahu for a truce. As usual, significant bargaining power was handed over initially with hopes of reciprocal actions later. However, Trump has not been putting pressure on Israel—on the contrary, Netanyahu recently initiated a large-scale ground operation in Gaza.

Assuming that Iran would abandon its key bargaining chip in favor of unclear American commitments requires an extent of Iranian faith in the U.S. that has not been present for more than 40 years. Despite the substantial offer of major sanction relief, this assumption still fails to alter that fundamental truth.

Moreover, even if Iran consents to a brief suspension of uranium enrichment, such an agreement would be questionable—unless the aim is to lock Tehran into permanently ceasing these activities. If not, then it merely represents a short-lived interruption without significant political benefits. The seasoned policymakers in Washington might respond indifferently, and the general U.S. populace—which has grown weary of prolonged conflicts and insider politics—is considerably more concerned with preventing hostilities and fostering employment opportunities rather than making symbolic moves regarding nuclear programs.

Indeed, the Iranians recognize that the purpose of a freeze is primarily to keep them in an indefinite condition of no enrichment, which is exactly why they are not likely to consent to it.

In essence, the aim of achieving zero uranium enrichment was specifically what John Bolton and Mike Pompeo were pushing for, as they understood it would ultimately result in conflict. This holds valid even at present.

Trump promised the American people no new wars in the Middle East. He needs a better strategy if he wishes to deliver on that promise.

This story originally appeared on Responsible Statecraft with this story

• Enrichment is the sticking point as US-Iran talks cautiously 'hopeful'
• Poll: Nearly two-thirds of Republicans support talks with Iran

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