The End of Unchecked Free Markets: A New Economic Consensus Emerges

Across the second decade of the 21st century, the tectonic plates structuring American politics and life began to shift. Even before the pandemic struck, developments that 10 years earlier would have seemed inconceivable now dominated politics and popular consciousness: the election — and reelection — of Donald Trump and the launch of a presidency like no other; the rise of Bernie Sanders and the resurrection of a socialist left; the sudden and deep questioning of open borders and free trade; the surge of populism and ethnonationalism and the castigation of once-celebrated globalizing elites; the decline of Barack Obama’s stature and the transformational promise that his presidency once embodied for so many; and the widening conviction that the American political system was no longer working, and that American democracy was in crisis.

Within this bewildering range of political changes, I perceive the decline—or at least the fragmentation—of a political system that emerged during the 1970s and 1980s and became predominant in the 1990s and early years of the 21st century. This political framework is what I refer to as a neoliberal order. While Ronald Reagan crafted its core ideology, Bill Clinton played an essential role in making it happen.

The term "political order" refers to an array of ideologies, policies, and groups that influence American politics over extended periods, transcending individual electoral cycles. Over the past century, the U.S. has experienced two primary political orders: first was the New Deal era which emerged in the 1930s and '40s, peaked during the 1950s and '60s, then declined in the 1970s; followed by the neoliberal order that began in the late 1970s and early '80s, reached its zenith from the 1990s through the 2000s, before waning in the 2010s.

At the core of both political systems lay distinct approaches to economics. The New Deal rested on the idea that unregulated capitalism inevitably led to economic crises. Consequently, it required oversight from a robust centralized authority capable of managing the economy for the benefit of all citizens. Conversely, the neoliberal model emerged based on the principle that freeing markets from governmental regulations—which supposedly stifled progress, creativity, and personal liberty—was essential. In the 1980s and '90s, proponents of this new approach aimed to tear down every structure established during the four-decade tenure of the New Deal era. Today, even this latter framework finds itself under attack.

Creating a stable political system necessitates much more than just securing one or two elections. It involves wealthy contributors and Political Action Committees supporting aspiring politicians for extended periods. Additionally, it entails forming think tanks and policy groups to transform political concepts into practical initiatives. A growing political party must also be capable of repeatedly attracting various voter bases. The ability to influence public sentiment at elite levels such as the Supreme Court and through traditional and digital media channels is crucial. Lastly, it needs a ethical viewpoint that can motivate voters with compelling images of a desirable future.

In essence, political systems are intricate endeavors that demand progress in multiple areas simultaneously. They seldom emerge spontaneously; typically, new ones surface when an established system collapses during an economic downturn, which subsequently leads to a governance crisis. The phenomenon known as "stagflation" catalyzed the decline of the New Deal era in the 1970s; similarly, the worldwide financial meltdown and subsequent recession from 2008-09 instigated the disintegration of the neoliberal framework in recent years.

During times of decline, political concepts and initiatives once considered extreme, unconventional, or impractical, or those written off as figments of the overactive imagination of extremist factions on both sides, can shift from being peripheral to becoming central. This occurred in the 1970s when the disintegration of the New Deal era enabled previously scorned neoliberal notions for restructuring the economy to gain traction. Similarly, this transpired in the 2010s when the erosion of the neoliberal framework created an opening for movements like Trump’s populism and Bernie Sanders’ socialism to thrive.

Conservative and liberal

In the United States, conservatism has often been used to encapsulate the political shifts known as neoliberalism. However, why should we characterize the political system that prevailed over America during the latter part of the 20th century and the start of the 21st century as neoliberal instead of conservative? This decision warrants an elucidation.

In the traditional understanding, conservatism embodies reverence for established customs, acknowledgment of current societal structures and their hierarchical nature, along with skepticism towards alterations. These principles have been evident in U.S. political discourse over much of the latter part of the 20th century. Notably, many white southerners exhibited a strong resolve during the civil rights movement to uphold systems of racial superiority. Similarly, numerous individuals nationwide invoked traditions as they resisted progressive initiatives advocating for gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and broader personal freedoms.

Many American conservative views often don’t align well with this political classification. Embracing unrestricted market capitalism, fostering entrepreneurship, and encouraging economic ventures were key aspects of the Republican Party’s platform during much of the late 20th century. However, these principles weren't focused on sustaining traditional values or the structures supporting them; instead, they aimed at challenging conventions and dismantling establishments that hindered progress.

Neoliberalism advocates for maximizing the strength of capitalist forces. During the Clinton era, significant policy initiatives reshaped America’s information/communications and financial sectors substantially. These changes have had a crucial impact on the nation’s economic landscape in the 21st century.

Despite this, these restructuring efforts have garnered less recognition than they warrant, with their importance overshadowed by the contentious cultural battles of that era. These cultural conflicts should not be dismissed; neither should we overlook the racial reaction following the Civil Rights Movement. However, it is crucial now to shift greater emphasis onto the project of reshaping the economy, providing it thorough scrutiny it merits, and revising our understanding of late 20th-century America as a result.

The neoliberal system was based on the idea that liberating market forces from governmental regulations—which were seen as hindering progress, creativity, and liberty—was essential. The creators of this neoliberal framework aimed to tear down all the structures established during the 40-year tenure of the New Deal era. This system is also currently undergoing deconstruction.

Neoliberalism advocates for unrestricted commerce, views deregulation as economically beneficial, and esteems cosmopolitan culture as a result of open boundaries and the resulting voluntary integration of numerous distinct groups. It promotes globalization as a mutually advantageous scenario that not only bolsters the West (neoliberalism’s epicenter), but also bestows unparalleled levels of affluence upon the remainder of the globe. During the peak of the neoliberal era, these core tenets significantly influenced American political discourse.

Neoliberalism aimed to incorporate the tenets of classical liberalism into political economics. Born in the 18th century, classical liberalism recognized the remarkable vitality and potential of markets for fostering commerce, accumulating wealth, and elevating standards of living. This ideology endeavored to free markets from constraints such as monarchical control, mercantilist policies, bureaucratic interference, arbitrary boundaries, and taxes. In essence, it strove to detach economic activities from extensive governmental oversight under all forms of state intervention. Neoliberalism promoted enabling individuals to navigate freely in search of personal gain and prosperity. Furthermore, it supported allowing inherent abilities to flourish—or decline—naturally without external hindrances. Embedded within this philosophy were aspirations for liberation and transformative societal change through the empowerment of individuals.

Each student of neoliberalism needs to closely examine its severe aspects, such as the use of coercive methods to enforce market discipline on societies; unwavering backing for achieving capitalistic growth; and a disregard for issues concerning economic equity and wealth distribution.

However, a perspective focused solely on elites fails to adequately explain why neoliberal ideas gained such widespread acceptance in the U.S. Reagan persuaded numerous Americans that aligning with his political movement would liberate the economy from regulatory constraints and grant them liberty. He portrayed this liberty as an inherent right for all Americans; according to him, striving for this liberty was what spurred the American Revolution and led to the founding of the nation. By reviving the liberation rhetoric of early liberal thought for a contemporary audience in the latter part of the 20th century, Reagan managed to become one of America’s most beloved public figures.

Competing moral perspectives

The global roots and influence of neoliberalism have been extensively explored by numerous academics. However, these analyses often fail to address the impact of the Soviet Union and communism as a whole. Among the significant occurrences of the 20th century, few can rival the magnitude of the 1917 Russian Revolution. Over the fifty years following their ascendancy in Russia, communist forces isolated substantial portions of the globe—the expansive territory of the Soviet Union, followed by swathes of Eastern Europe, and eventually China—from market economies.

During the initial phase of the Cold War, communism represented a significant challenge in Western Europe. For roughly eighty years throughout this period, it similarly loomed large over numerous countries coming into existence across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Radical right ideologies like fascism and Nazism emerged partly as reactions to the ascent of communism. In contrast, within the U.S., starting from the 1920s onwards, communism was seen as an existential threat to traditional American values. Although the economic downturn during the Great Depression and global conflict with WWII somewhat eased anti-communist sentiments in America for some time, no other singular political movement exerted such extensive sway globally or domestically through much of the twentieth century.

The impact of—and the terror caused by—the communist threat has mostly faded from memory. However, the outcomes following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991 and the concurrent demise of its supporting philosophy were significant, paving the way for neoliberalism’s victory both within America and across the globe.

A clear outcome of the collapse of communism was the opening up of vast regions—namely Russia and Eastern Europe—to capitalist influence. Additionally, this shift significantly increased China's (which still officially claims to be communist) readiness to explore market-based economic systems. Consequently, capitalism expanded globally during the 1990s in a manner unseen since before the outbreak of World War I.

Another consequence of communism’s fall may be less obvious but is of equal importance: It removed what had been an imperative in America (and in Europe and elsewhere) for compromise between capitalist elites and the working classes. From the 1930s through the 1960s, communism was understood through the lens of totalitarianism. A nation once lost to communism would never be regained for the capitalist world (or so the influential theory of totalitarianism taught). Thus the specter of communist advance required a policy of military containment unprecedented in American history. The fear of communism made possible the class compromise between capital and labor that underwrote the New Deal order, and similar agreements in many social democracies in Europe after World War II.

During times of downturn, political concepts and initiatives once considered extreme, unconventional, or impractical shift from being peripheral to becoming central in public discourse.

The exact timeframe of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism as a whole—between 1989 and 1991—clarifies why the 1990s became a pivotal era for neoliberalism's victory over previous systems, surpassing even what occurred during the 1980s. It also highlights how Bill Clinton played an essential part in cementing neoliberal policies' dominance, sometimes overshadowing Ronald Reagan’s influence. Post-1991, capitalists and those aligned with them faced less urgency to negotiate terms favorable to workers. Consequently, spaces where left-leaning movements could advocate were significantly reduced. This period marked the shift of neoliberal ideals from being merely aspirational within certain political circles into becoming entrenched societal norms.

Each political system encompasses ideological inconsistencies and disputes among various groups that it needs to handle; the neoliberal framework was not an exemption from this aspect. A key inconsistency, as previously mentioned, lay between those who viewed neoliberalism as a method for reinforcing elite governance and others who perceived it as a route towards individual freedom.

In this arrangement, another perspective exists uneasily alongside the principles of neoliberalism—a set of values I refer to as neo-Victorian. These beliefs extol individual responsibility, robust familial structures, and strict approaches towards labor, personal relationships, and spending habits. Given that neoliberal policies typically opposed governmental intervention into personal matters, alternative mechanisms were required to enforce these standards. The neo-Victorian ethos identified such institutions primarily through conventional households—specifically those adhering strictly to heteronormative roles with men at the helm. It was presumed that under divine guidance, these homes could instill ethical integrity among their inhabitants, particularly younger generations, preparing them adequately for competitive economic environments. This philosophy resonated strongly amongst followers associated with figures like Jerry Falwell; they formed significant political blocs as key constituents within powerful religious groups, notably including the Moral Majority.

Another ethical viewpoint promoted by the neoliberal system, which I refer to as cosmopolitan, viewed market liberty as a chance to create a self or identity unshackled from traditions, heritage, and predetermined societal positions. Within the U.S., this ethical stance gained momentum from the liberation movements stemming from the New Left of the 1960s and thrived during the age of neoliberal dominance. The concept of cosmopolitanism dismissed the idea that traditional nuclear families—headed by men, with heterosexual relationships—are worthy of being seen as standard norms. Instead, it welcomed globalization along with unrestricted human mobility and cross-border connections facilitated by the neoliberal framework. This ideology esteemed the positive outcomes arising when various groups interacted, exchanged cultural insights, and developed innovative and frequently blended lifestyles.

The presence of these two distinct ethical viewpoints simultaneously fortified and undermined the neoliberal system. On one hand, this arrangement bolstered the order by enabling a wide array of groups with vastly differing views on morality to coexist under a unified framework of economic policy. Conversely, it also posed a risk as conflicts arising from these contrasting outlooks could potentially destabilize the dominance of neoliberal economic doctrines.

The cosmopolitans criticized the neo-Victorians for discriminating against LGBTQ+ individuals, women, and immigrants, as well as for labeling low-income African Americans' economic struggles as part of a "culture of poverty." Conversely, the neo-Victorians accused the cosmopolitans of endorsing nearly every lifestyle choice without criticism, justifying harmful actions under the guise of accepting differences, and valuing foreign traditions more highly than those native to the U.S. During what many see as the peak era of neoliberal dominance—the 1990s—cosmopolitans and neo-Victorians engaged in numerous conflicts referred to collectively as the “culture wars.” Indeed, this emphasis on cultural divides remains the favored approach when chronicling the political narrative of that period. Political scholars often consider polarization central to understanding modern American politics, dedicating much effort toward elucidating both its emergence and impact on shaping—or perhaps distorting—American society.

If the government could shape markets via tariffs and immigration restriction, might there be other ways in which the state could exercise authority over the economy? If social media companies could be regulated or broken up, what about other corporations that had accumulated too much power?

I acknowledge the existence of this polarization, which could potentially lead to the disintegration of the neoliberal system. However, we must not let this overshadow the simultaneous occurrence of cultural divide alongside widespread consensus on fundamental concepts of political economics. This seemingly contradictory blend of cultural discord and shared views on politics and economics was evident in the intricate dynamic between Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich during the 1990s.

In the media, they were portrayed (and portrayed themselves) as adversaries destined for mutual annihilation. Clinton positioned himself as the champion of the New America. He was seen as representing the essence of the 1960s and capturing some aspects of the rebellious, carefree nature of the New Left. Conversely, Gingrich cast himself as the protector of a more traditional and "authentic" America, rooted in faith, patriotism, adherence to law and order, and strong family values.

Nevertheless, even with their disparities and mutual animosity, these two influential figures from Washington joined forces to craft legislation that would mold America’s political economy for decades to come. Their covert cooperation facilitated the ascendancy of the neoliberal regime. Revealing the scenes from the 1990s exposes a robust and consistent economic consensus that upheld the neoliberal framework throughout numerous cultural conflicts spanning years.

Trump and the emerging regime

Many were taken aback by the result of the 2016 election, including Donald Trump himself. He didn’t truly anticipate winning. His experience with managing operations was limited to both public and corporate sectors. Running the Trump Organization—a business largely managed by just a handful—didn’t equip him adequately for steering an extensive and intricate federal entity. Additionally, Trump hadn’t made much preparation for his presidency; this oversight was crucial since he needed to handle various governmental positions along with mastering multiple policies during his transition period after being elected president.

However, Trump continued to excel at dominating the political arena, thereby capturing the nation's focus. Almost no Americans, regardless of their stance—whether they backed or opposed Trump—could look away from him, or more precisely, from the screens broadcasting his most recent provocations through social media platforms. Daily, Trump ensnared both the American media and the general populace in what he styled as "the greatest show on earth"—an endless performance featuring adversaries being ousted, integrity upheld, achievements celebrated, and friendly foreign leaders (ideally those exhibiting autocratic tendencies) praised. Over weeks and months, Trump’s behavior held America captive, split it apart, and eventually drained its energy.

It frequently proved difficult to identify a clear-cut political agenda amidst the chaos and turmoil stirred up by the Trump upheaval. However, two distinct strategies did emerge from the Trump administration: one aimed at sustaining the prevailing neoliberal system, and another geared toward scrapping it altogether. The latter approach was deemed more significant and is expected to exert greater influence over time.

At heart, the Koch brothers were staunch neoliberals who strongly disliked Trump throughout the Republican primary process. However, when Trump chose Mike Pence, the governor of Indiana, as his vice-presidential candidate, it created an opportunity for reconciliation between them. The Kochs had long been preparing Pence for higher office within the nation. By selecting him, they ensured that their policy of reducing regulations could reach the White House, accompanied by hopes that he might spearhead efforts to remove several federal agencies' supervisory powers, thereby curbing the government’s capacity to oversee economic activities.

Despite not truly believing that markets could be perfected as tools for trade, Trump decided to support the notion of reducing the power of the federal government. He thought this move might reveal and weaken what he called the "deep state," which he suspected was entrenched within organizations like the CIA and FBI, aiming according to him at undermining his administration. Additionally, Trump collaborated extensively with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to nominate numerous judges to the federal courts; these nominees were selected by the Federalist Society based on their consistent stance against regulation in economic matters and their adherence to conservative views on social issues. Lastly, Trump advocated for significant changes to the tax system, leading to substantial cuts in corporate taxation and minor reductions in income taxes primarily benefiting individuals in higher tax brackets.

If deregulation, judicial appointments and tax cuts pointed toward the maintenance of a neoliberal order, however, Trump’s assault on free trade and immigration aimed at its destruction. In Trump’s eyes, free trade among nations was harming America; so was the free movement of people across national borders. Trump wanted to build walls against both and to allow into America only those goods and individuals that it wanted, and under conditions of its choosing.

Trump capitalized on every chance to push the U.S. away from its longstanding role as the leading proponent of globalization and free trade worldwide. He lambasted Europe not only for exploiting the United States economically but also for failing to contribute adequately to NATO’s expenses. He emerged as the inaugural president to openly doubt NATO’s worthiness, along with the strong ties between Europe and North America fostered by this multilateral military alliance. His backing of Brexit stemmed more from his animosity toward the EU—a type of globalist and multicultural union he detested—than from genuine support for an autonomous UK. Additionally, he contemplated informing the press about potentially pulling back American forces stationed in places like South Korea and various spots within the Middle East.

Nearer to home, Trump warned of potential trade wars with Canada and Mexico to pressure these nations into revising the North American Free Trade Agreement in a manner more advantageous to U.S. interests (a stance he carried over into his second term).

Increasingly, the decade of the 2010s began to mirror the periods of the 1930s and the 1970s—times when the erosion of a prevailing political system enabled concepts previously relegated to the fringes of American politics to gain traction in the center stage.

Trump found out that he could impose tariffs independently, bypassing Congressional approval, as long as he argued that these measures bolstered national security. A key part of Trump's argument was that free trade had exclusively profited "global elites." During the closing stages of the 2016 presidential election, he aired an advertisement asserting that a "global power elite" had exploited America's working class, depleted the nation's resources, and channeled this wealth into the coffers of major corporations and political groups. He pledged that under his leadership, this system would be overturned and replaced with one designed to serve average American citizens.

Trump wanted the breakup of the neoliberal order to benefit the authoritarian right. But the breakup was also benefiting a social democratic left that liberal Senators Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and others had been infusing with new life. Trump’s constant talk of putting tariffs on imports, stopping the free movement of people across borders and challenging media companies had the effect of widening the space in which those engaged in politics could think more freely — and ambitiously — about the proper role of government in economic life. If the government could shape markets via tariffs and immigration restriction, might there be other ways in which the state could exercise authority over the economy? If social media companies could be regulated or broken up, what about other corporations that had accumulated too much power?

Increasingly, the decade of the 2010s began to mirror the periods of the 1930s and 1970s—times when the erosion of an established political system opened up space for concepts previously marginalized within American politics to gain traction. The capacity to dictate what becomes part of the ideological core often indicates the success of a particular political framework; conversely, losing this influence marks the downfall of such a structure. Donald Trump, alongside Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, played significant roles in challenging the dominance of neoliberal thought, thereby fostering new openings for formerly fringe political notions and actions to thrive.

In the 2018 elections, the left leveraged its newfound institutional capability and ideological enthusiasm to gain political influence. Four progressive Democrats secured congressional seats: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez

In New York, we have Cortez; in Minnesota, Ilhan Omar; in Massachusetts, Ayanna Pressley; and in Michigan, Rashida Tlaib. Their achievements propelled Bernie Sanders (once more) and Elizabeth Warren to the forefront as leading contenders for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination. Following the economic downturn from 2008-2009, Warren gained nationwide recognition by uncovering how banks engaged in exploitative lending tactics against typical consumers.

Subsequently, particularly during her 2020 presidential run, Warren started focusing on major U.S. tech firms—Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft—for amassing excessive riches and influence. Her team aimed at reviving America’s historical opposition to monopolies, an activism from roughly a century ago that fueled progressivism through measures like dismantling big businesses and regulating those that survived. In contrast, Sanders proposed bolder strategies with the aim of fully realizing his social democracy ideals within American society.

The unexpected catalyst behind this resurgence on the left was none other than Joe Biden, who would later be nominated as the Democratic candidate for president in 2020 and subsequently take office himself. As late as early 2020, many people did not place significant importance on Biden’s achievements throughout his extensive political tenure. However, starting from March 2020, he managed to imbue his campaign with renewed hope and attractiveness. Just like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren—and unlike several others—he recognized that the nation stood at a pivotal juncture; traditional Democratic policies since Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were inadequate, necessitating bold ideas and decisive actions. Biden embraced supporters of Sanders and Warren into his broader democratic alliance, enabling their input towards a comprehensive plan which included substantial investments in tangible infrastructures, establishing expansive systems aimed at enhancing living standards among Americans of all ages, and encouraging businesses through government incentives to relocate production back home and hasten environmental transitions. His approach leveraged governmental strategies to guide market forces aligning with societal benefits—a stark departure from conventional economic doctrines prevalent under the reign of neo-liberalism.

Biden’s victory in November 2020 earned him majorities in Congress, but ones that were too small to achieve more than a portion of his agenda. Even his genuinely impressive accomplishments — for example, approving more than 50,000 infrastructural projects in the first two years of his administration — received little public attention or support. Instead, the difficulties of restarting an economy that Covid had compelled the government to shut down dominated public consciousness, leading many to sour on those in charge. Much of the disenchantment with Biden was rooted in pandemic realities over which his administration had, in truth, little control: the loss of loved ones to Covid, long stretches of enforced personal isolation, and the disruption of supply chains that contributed to the worst inflationary spike in 50 years.

Although various indicators showed that the U.S. economy performed strongly in 2023 and 2024, making it the admiration of numerous international figures, most Americans remained unconvinced. With President Biden’s advancing years affecting his capacity to effectively communicate his administration's successes, people started reminiscing about what they perceived as the "golden era" during the early part of the Trump presidency before the pandemic. Despite forgiving Trump for not acknowledging his loss in the 2020 election and glossing over his involvement in inciting the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, these individuals propelled him back into office in 2024.

What comes next

So far, the economic strategies of Trump 2.0 closely mirror those from Trump 1.0. High import tariffs continue to be imposed on most goods entering the U.S., undermining the principles of free trade associated with neoliberalism. There is also a push to dismantle the framework of international laws and institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO—organizations that supported both the New Deal and neoliberal frameworks. Once more, the European Union finds itself at odds with him. Discussions persist regarding potential withdrawal from NATO, reflecting efforts to disengage not only from globalized trade systems but also from the extensive military protection network established by the U.S. Trump remains steadfast in sealing off America’s southern borders and halting unlawful immigration, simultaneously reducing lawful migration channels into the country. Just as previously stated, he aims for Make America Great Again (MAGA) to reshape America into an impenetrable stronghold, allowing entry solely to select individuals deemed desirable immigrants.

Despite everything, Trump has become much more assertive and focused when it comes to pushing forward his policies. His group, headed by Stephen Miller and Russell Vought (the creator of "Project 2025"), used their period outside office to devise strategies for maximizing the use of presidential powers once they regained control. The dramatic flurry of activity during Trump’s initial 100 days—including an avalanche of executive orders—can be largely attributed to Miller’s and Vought’s tactical planning. Their efforts were further bolstered by Elon Musk joining forces with them and bringing along a squad akin to 'DOGE commandos' ready to dismantle significant parts of what he refers to as the "deep state." Although this partnership between Musk and Trump seems temporary, the remainder of Trump’s team remains loyal, including Chief of Staff Susie Wiles who brings organizational skill and stability to the administration from backstage.

Trump has also purged his administration (and much of his party) of Republican establishment figures. The Mark Kellys, Gary Cohns and Jim Mattises of Trump 1.0 are nowhere to be found in the current White House and Cabinet. Meanwhile, Trump seems no longer to fear a 20 to 25 percent stock market crash, which makes him more willing than he had been in his first term to upend the world trading and financial systems, believing that the rewards accruing to the U.S. long term will be worth what he considers to be short-term risk.

Is "Trump Unbound" likely to establish a fresh political framework similar to those established by its Rooseveltian and Reaganite forerunners? This remains uncertain. The disarray, inconsistency, and inadequate governance skills exhibited during Trump’s initial tenure persist in his second term. However, the electoral alliance that propelled Trump back into power is both broader and more varied compared to his earlier campaign, leading to significant disagreements over crucial policy matters within this coalition.

Consider tariffs as an illustration. A segment of Trump's tariff advocacy is indeed rooted in populism, believing that bringing back manufacturing jobs will lead to improved employment opportunities for America's working class. Figures like Oren Cass from the policy institute American Compass and Julius Krein, who edits American Affairs, articulate this populist stance—or more precisely, their version which they term "economic nationalism." Steve Bannon also aligns with this viewpoint. These advocates have considerable influence within several governmental bodies, including key roles at the Departments of State and Commerce. However, within Congress, a significant number of Republicans—the remaining neoliberal faction—are primarily focused on reducing taxes and loosening regulations. For them, tariffs hold allure not due to potential benefits for workers, but because they could yield substantial additional funds to enable hefty tax reductions for high-income earners. The question remains whether Trump can sustain a political alliance between those prioritizing tax breaks and self-styled economic nationalists—between affluent elites and members of the working class. Could differing objectives among these factions fracture the Make America Great Again (MAGA) initiative?

Can Trump effectively lead a political alliance between tax-cut advocates and economic protectionists, as well as bridge the gap between wealthy elites and working-class supporters? Or might the conflicting goals of these different factions lead to the breakup of the Make America Great Again movement?

Ultimately, Trump appears indifferent to emulating a key aspect of how Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan established their "political order": achieving resounding election wins. Both Roosevelt’s landslide win in 1936 and Reagan’s decisive triumph in 1984 left the opposing parties—Republicans after Roosevelt and Democrats following Reagan—in such confusion that they accepted the victors' central economic policies for extended periods. For Trump—or potentially one of his successors—to secure similar success in 2028, he could have focused during his initial year back in power on reaching out further to Latino voters, African Americans, and independent supporters than he did in 2024. However, expanding his voter base isn’t part of his strategy. Rather, he acts as if he has already secured a massive victory. His rapid succession of bold, sometimes extreme executive actions aims to solidify what he perceives as a significant public endorsement.

Nevertheless, this expansive authority remains an illusion. Throughout his three presidential campaigns, Donald Trump has failed to secure a majority of the popular vote. Although he did win the popular vote in 2024 with 49.8% compared to Kamala Harris’s 48.3%, his margin of triumph does not come close to matching the overwhelming victories achieved by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, who garnered over 58% of the popular vote and secured nearly all—98%—of the electoral votes in their respective landslide years of 1936 and 1984. If just 270,000 fewer votes had switched sides across three key Midwest battlegrounds from Republicans to Democrats in 2024, the outcome would have flipped dramatically, delivering the Electoral College—and thus the presidency—to Kamala Harris instead of Trump.

Trump’s apparent indifference to expanding his electoral base to secure long-term MAGA dominance may reflect his belief that he can consolidate his movement’s power through other means. Here the critical influence may not be Roosevelt or Reagan, but Viktor Orbán of Hungary. Orbán has kept himself in power for 15 consecutive years by rigging Hungarian politics in his party’s favor. He has suppressed free speech, instilled fear in his political opponents who go against his wishes and vote for the “wrong” candidate, compromised the courts and stripped independence away from universities and other civil society institutions.

Several of Trump’s advisors aim to "Orbanize" America. Their objective is to shape the voter base so meticulously that narrow election wins for a sitting Republican administration become virtually guaranteed. Under such plans, both Congress and the judiciary would be rendered ineffective to the extent that they can no longer act as constraints on executive authority. Despite these changes, American politics might retain some democratic appearances (such as holding elections), yet the core principles of democracy would erode significantly. This potential transformation could very well align with what Trump envisions for the country’s political landscape.

Should he succeed in this undertaking, Trump would establish a novel political framework within America, yet one distinct from all prior systems.

Gary Gerstle serves as an emeritus professor and conducts research in American history at the University of Cambridge. This piece is derived from his publication titled "The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era" (published by Oxford University Press). The copyright for this work belongs to Gary Gerstle and was published in 2022.

This tale is featured in the June 2025 edition of Deseret Magazine . Discover more information on subscribing. .